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A THREE-TIERED PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH
TO COPYRIGHT MISUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Sandy Azer*
Over two decades since the copyright misuse doctrine was first
recognized in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, a uniform approach
for determining whether a specific behavior constitutes misuse still does not
exist. Circuit courts have commonly applied two competing approaches to
the misuse analysis. One approach centers on the public policy underlying
copyrights; the other approach centers on antitrust principles. This Note
explores relevant jurisprudence and elucidates the shortfalls of each
approach. It then proposes a compromise that underscores the interplay
between copyright and antitrust laws. The proposed resolution aims to
provide a much-needed uniform misuse analysis that does not overlook the
important policies underlying copyright law, or disregard antitrust
principles relevant in the context of tying arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
In early December 2012, Google released its “Maps” application for
Apple’s iPhone. For many iPhone 5 users, this was indeed an early
Christmas present. The iPhone 5, the smartphone that millions of
Americans preordered and eagerly anticipated for most of 2012, had been
released without Google Maps and came preloaded instead with Apple’s
own mapping application. The decision to replace Google Maps with its
own mapping application in the iOS 6 operating system is yet another
example of Apple’s “compulsion . . . to have end-to-end control of every
product that it [makes].”1 To Apple’s disappointment, however, it became
immediately apparent that its mapping application was inferior to that of its

1. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 561 (2011).
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rival.2 Saving the day, or more accurately, lost iPhone users, Google
readily stepped in and released yet another top-notch mapping application.3
As a leader in technology, Apple has not accepted defeat and is pushing to
improve its Maps application.4 It is anticipated that Apple’s revamping
efforts will be evident in its latest iOS 7 operating system.5 As computer
software, both Apple Maps and Google Maps are copyrighted works.6
Assuming that Apple is successful in its “quest for perfection”7 and
creates a superior mapping application for the iOS 7 operating system,
would conditioning the purchase of the iPhone on the use or purchase of its
copyrighted mapping application be a misuse of Apple’s copyright? If so,
would a defendant in an infringement claim be able to assert the misuse as
an affirmative defense?
In this hypothetical scenario, Apple’s attempt to tie one of its products to
another is a classic example of a tying arrangement.8 A tying arrangement
involves conditioning the sale or licensing of one product on the customer’s
agreement to purchase or license another.9 Consistent with that definition,
a “‘block’ or ‘package’” license, requiring a buyer or lessee to take more
than one copyrighted product, can also constitute a tying arrangement.10
The “tying” product is the one sought by the consumer and the “tied”
product is the one additionally required, which the consumer is essentially
coerced to purchase or lease.11 In the example above, the iPhone is the

2. Michael Liedtke, Google Maps Return to iPhone with New Mobile App, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 13, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/google-maps-return-iphonenew-mobile-app.
3. Nicole Goodkind, Google Maps: Did Apple Cave to Consumer Pressure?, CNBC
(Dec. 14, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100315928/Google_Maps_Did_Apple_
Cave_to_Consumer_Pressure (“[Google Maps] has become the most downloaded free
application in the Apple app store.”); David Pogue, A Better Google Maps App for Apple
and Android Devices, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://pogue.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/07/10/an-improved-google-maps-app-for-apple-and-android-devices/.
4. Tim Cook, A Letter from Tim Cook on Maps, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/letterfrom-tim-cook-on-maps/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
5. Daniel Eran Dilger, iOS 7 Maps Go Full Screen, Navigation Gets Night Mode, New
Siri Options, APPLE INSIDER (July 12, 2013, 12:55 PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/
13/07/12/ios-7-maps-go-full-screen-navigation-gets-night-mode-new-siri-options.
6. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of how software can qualify as copyrightable.
7. ISAACSON, supra note 1, at 561.
8. James B. Stewart, The Shadow of Steve Jobs in Apple’s Maps Push, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/business/apples-map-appcould-raise-antitrust-concerns.html.
9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1660 (9th ed. 2009); see also Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969).
10. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 55 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
11. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992); N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (defining a tying arrangement as “an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier”); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421,
1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
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tying product and Apple’s mapping application is the tied product. This
Note explores the treatment of copyright misuse in the context of tying
arrangements in an attempt to answer the questions above and similar ones.
While tying arrangements can give rise to independent antitrust claims,12
the focus of this Note is the copyright misuse doctrine and the lack of
clarity surrounding its application to tying arrangements. By definition,
copyright creates a limited monopoly;13 thus, courts frequently invoke
antitrust law when copyright holders attempt to use their copyright in
impermissible ways.14 Other courts have approached the copyright inquiry
from a public policy perspective.15 Therefore, a general understanding of
both copyright and antitrust laws is necessary to contextualize the different
approaches courts pursue in determining copyright misuse.16
From an intellectual property perspective, tying arrangements raise red
flags because copyright owners and patent holders can use them “to obtain
property rights outside the scope of the patent and the copyright and [to]
obtain benefits in markets outside the coverage of the grant.”17 Similarly,
such arrangements are sometimes condemned from an antitrust perspective
because they can unlawfully restrain trade of the tied product.18
Yet a dispute exists regarding whether, in some cases, tying can be
economically justified. Many commentators advocate for the continued
illegality of tying arrangements because such arrangements “injure rivals in
the tied product market by cutting off their access to adequate markets,”19
facilitate collusion and “anticompetitive price discrimination,”20 and work
in opposition to the goal of promoting “the maximization of consumer
welfare.”21 In contrast, other commentators argue that such arrangements
should be presumed lawful because of the benefits they confer on buyers
and society, such as lower transaction costs.22 This Note, consonant with
the weight of case law, adheres to the former view, maintaining that tying
arrangements should continue to be proscribed to prevent their harmful
effects.
12. See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 9–10 (3d ed. 2006).

LAW: AN ANALYSIS

13. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th
Cir. 2007). See generally Scott L. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory
Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 382–84 (1986).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.
17. Ilan Charnelle, The Justification and Scope of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Its
Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167, 173 (2002); see infra Part II.
18. See infra Part I.B.3.
19. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21–32 (2d ed. Supp. 2012).
20. Id.
21. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1 (6th ed. 2009).
22. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 36–38.
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Part I provides an overview of copyright and antitrust laws as relevant to
the context of this Note. Part II explores policy rationales and relevant case
law in the context of tying arrangements under the public policy and
antitrust approaches, respectively, underscoring the lack of uniformity in
the evaluation of copyright misuse. Finally, Part III points out the
inadequacies of these two approaches, which are predominantly applied by
courts, and proposes a multi-tiered approach that would provide a more
defined framework to the misuse analysis while holding steadfast to the
underlying goals of copyright law.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAW
This Part provides background information on copyright and antitrust
laws for Part II’s discussion of the public policy and antitrust approaches
and Part III’s proposed three-tiered approach to the judicial treatment of
possible tying arrangements implicating copyright.
A. An Introduction to Copyright Law
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution enumerates
important and expansive powers given to Congress.23 Specifically,
Clause 8 gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”24 In
interpreting this clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned,
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful
Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.25

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Id. The Patent and Copyright Clause is the basis for U.S. patent and copyright laws.
While patent law, which protects new innovations, is relevant in the context of the
development of the misuse doctrine, patent law more generally is outside the scope of this
Note. For more information on patent law, see MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW 31–35 (5th ed. 2010).
25. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (observing that the grant of copyright
protections “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired”); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v.
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The Clause authorizes the granting of a
temporary monopoly over created works, in order to motivate authors and inventors while
assuring the public free access at the end of the monopoly.”); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 17
(“In general, arguments for establishing property rights in anything . . . are justified on two
fundamental grounds: first, a person’s moral right to reap the fruits of his or her own labor
. . . and second, a utilitarian rationale that views copyright law as an incentive system
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This desire to incentivize creators and inventors has become especially
important in the post-industrial era, which marked the rise of technological
developments and information industries.26 At the same time, however, a
capitalistic market crumbles if it abandons its competitive elements and
becomes overly monopolistic.27 As such, restraints and limitations are
often put in place to ensure the functionality of our multifaceted, and often
convoluted, economic system.28 In this manner, the broadly defined
copyright grants are prevented from becoming excessively or perpetually
protective at the expense of public creativity and future developments.29
To provide a clear understanding of copyright law, this section briefly
summarizes its historical development, the requirements and scope of the
copyright grant, and the evolution and treatment of the misuse doctrine.
1. A Brief History: From England’s Statute of Anne to
America’s Copyright Act of 1976
The first copyright act, the Statute of Anne, was passed in England in
1710,30 and granted authors the limited exclusive right to make copies of
their own work.31 This statute was the last response in a series of efforts to
balance the benefits of the printing press with authors’ ownership rights.32
The invention of the printing press made the publishing process more time
efficient and less costly, naturally benefiting publishers and sellers.33
However, the original authors obtained no additional benefit from these
large-volume publications.34 The Crown’s first response was to implement

designed to produce an optimal quantity of works of authorship, and thereby enhance public
welfare.”).
26. A 2006 Report estimated that in 2005, the copyright industries accounted for 6.56
percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, ECONOMISTS
INCORPORATED, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2006 REPORT 2 (2007),
available at www.iipa.com/pdf/2006_siwek_full.pdf; see also LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 2
(“While the U.S. continues to experience large and growing trade deficits, the copyright
industries continue to thrive in overseas sales and exports.”).
27. See generally 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 8 & n.2
(3d ed. 2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2d ed. 2001).
28. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–112; infra Part I.A.3.
29. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 285 (1996) (“Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors to
create and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of proprietary right in
their works. But to promote public education and creative exchange, it invites audiences and
subsequent authors to use existing works in every conceivable manner that falls outside the
province of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.”).
30. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
31. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 2, 4.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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temporary measures, chartering the Royal Stationers’ Company,35 which
exercised essentially unchecked monopoly power over publications and
prohibited publication prior to its approval.36 After 138 years, however, the
Company’s exclusive license expired, resulting in unregulated
competition.37 Parliament responded by passing the Statute of Anne which
limited authors’ rights to a specific number of years and “declared that [the
statute’s] ultimate purpose was to enhance public welfare by encouraging
the dissemination of knowledge.”38 Toward the end of the century, the
House of Lords reinforced that purpose in Donaldson v. Beckett, which
established that a copyright does not exist in perpetuity and that the work
falls into the public domain upon the expiration of the copyright grant.39
In the United States, the first Copyright Act was passed in 179040
pursuant to the constitutional authority of the Patent and Copyright
Clause.41 This Act was “modeled on the Statute of Anne, [and] set the tone
for future statutes.”42 Over the years, U.S. copyright law has drastically
changed, covering much broader ground and granting protection for a much
longer term.43 Nonetheless, two important features of copyright law have
remained consistent throughout its development in the United States: its
acclimation to technological changes and its underlying purpose.44
In 1905, President Roosevelt “called for complete revision of the
copyright law to meet modern conditions,” and four years later, Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 1909.45 Notably, in contrast to prior
35. The Royal Stationers’ Company was a London-based company that was involved in
the sale and trade of books. See generally CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY
31–33 (1960).
36. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838.
40. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); Colin Morrissey, Note,
Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory
Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059, 3064 (2010).
41. Some commentators have argued that the source of the language of the Patent and
Copyright Clause was the Statute of Anne. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F.
BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 242 (2009); Marvin Ammori, Note, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 306–07 (2002).
However, others have opined that because the Clause was adopted in a secret proceeding and
without debate, the framers’ intent and the purpose of the clause’s adoption are unknown.
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 6; Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, The Copyright Clause:
“A Charter for a Living People” (Aug. 10, 1987), reprinted in 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 102–
03 (1987).
42. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 6; see PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 41, at 242.
43. See generally PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 41, at 260–64.
44. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 3–4.
45. Id. at 7. For a detailed discussion of the 1909 Act, see generally W. Ron Gard &
Elizabeth Townsend Gard, The Present (User-Generated Crisis) Is the Past (1909 Copyright
Act): An Essay Theorizing the “Traditional Contours of Copyright” Language, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 455, 458–60 (2011). See also Kate Cross, Comment, David v.
Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments Against Individuals for
Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1039–41 (2010).
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legislation, under the 1909 Act, copyright protection was triggered by
publication and not by registration of the work,46 and imposed strict
liability on all infringers.47 The 1909 Act, however, failed to conform to
the first international copyright convention,48 the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.49 The Berne Convention remains
the principal copyright convention today, and its success is evidenced “by
its large number of adherents, which by the mid-1980s included every
major country in the world except China, the Soviet Union, and the United
States.”50 The 1909 Act conflicted with the Berne Convention in two major
ways: (1) it required notice on all published works, and (2) it provided for a
much shorter term of copyright protection.51 As a result, the 1909 Act
prevented the United States from conforming with international copyright
law.52
Congress amended the 1909 Act gradually, reflecting the evolving needs
of society and rapid technological changes.53 Eventually it became
apparent that a new and revised copyright statute was necessary, and
Congress authorized revision efforts in 1955.54 After two decades “of
reports and extensive hearings,” the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed.55
In 1989, the United States finally became a contracting party to the Berne
Convention.56
2. Title 17: Expansive Copyright Protection
The Copyright Act of 1976 was codified in Title 17 of the U.S. Code and
constitutes the current federal law on copyright protection.57 This section
will explain its important provisions.

46. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 7. See Gard & Gard, supra note 45, at 468 (“Under
the 1909 Copyright Act, federal legal protection only occurred upon the act of publication,
recognized as a required series of formal steps that gave proper notice of one’s intent to
enforce the copyright. In contrast, federal copyright protection under the
1976 Copyright Act arises automatically upon creation of the work . . . .”).
47. See generally Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Historical
Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 381–83 (2002).
48. LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 7–8.
49. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept.
9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979).
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 7–8.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). For more
information on the implementation of the Berne Convention in the United States, see
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 11–15.
57. Also, to the extent that federal and state copyright laws conflict, federal law
preempts. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964); MARY
LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2 (2008).
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a. The Statutory Requirements
Section 102 of Title 17 provides that copyright protection subsists “in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”58 Based on § 102, there are three copyright
requirements: (1) originality, (2) works of authorship, and (3) fixation in a
tangible medium.59 This section provides a brief explanation of each of the
requirements, respectively.
Originality of the work is the first requirement and the “sine qua non of
copyright.”60 To be original, a work must be both independently created by
the author and at least minimally creative.61 A work is independently
created if it is not copied from other works,62 and any “creative spark”
satisfies the creativity requirement, “‘no matter how crude, humble or
obvious’ it might be.”63 Generally, the author of the work is presumed to
be the one that created the work in question and the one entitled to
copyright ownership.64 Nonetheless, a legal entity, such as a corporation,
can be the “author” of the work under the work for hire doctrine.65

58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). In other words, “two essential elements—[an] original
work and [a] tangible object—must merge through fixation in order to produce subject
matter copyrightable under the statute.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
60. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“The copyright is limited
to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s
originality.”).
61. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
62. See id. at 345–46 (“[A] work may be original even though it closely resembles other
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. To illustrate, assume
that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel,
yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable.”).
63. Id. at 345 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)). “Originality does not require ‘novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit.’”
Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 51 (1976)); see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–
03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that
the ‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something
recognizably ‘his own.’” (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d
Cir. 1945))); see also Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th
Cir. 1988).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
737 (1989).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned
for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire.”); see also Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Friendly, J., dissenting); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 195–96.
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“Works of authorship” is the second statutory requirement and includes:
literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural
works.66 This list of categories is illustrative of copyrightable expressions
and is not exhaustive.67 The first category, “literary works,” is defined as
“works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the
material objects . . . in which they are embodied.”68 Computer programs
and software copyright protection falls under this category.69 Because
“‘literary works’ in section 101 includes expression not only in words but
also ‘numbers, or other . . . numerical symbols or indicia,’” computer
programs, which are expressed in object code, are also copyrightable.70
It is important to note, however, that copyright protection for any work of
authorship is limited to how an idea is expressed and does not extend to
“any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”71 Such material is
subject to patent, not copyright, protection.72

66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (stating that the list of categories are
“‘illustrative and not limitative,’ and . . . do not necessarily exhaust the scope of ‘original
works of authorship’ that the bill is intended to protect”); see LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 8.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d
Cir. 1987); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see also
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that while facts
are not protected, the specific compilation of the facts can fall within the scope of copyright
protection).
69. See LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 16 (stating that the “literary works” category
“includes all types of computer software—operating system software and applications
software”); LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 101; see, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phx. Control
Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983).
70. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1249 (“[A] computer program, whether in
object code or source code, is a ‘literary work’ and is protected from unauthorized copying,
whether from its object or source code version.”).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). For example, “[w]hile the factual information conveyed in a
map, such as landmarks and street locations, is not entitled to copyright protection, ‘any
originality in the manner of expression employed in communicating the factual information’
can be protected by a copyright.” City of N.Y. v. Geodata Plus, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 443,
450 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d
460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002)); see Corbello v. DeVito, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (D. Nev.
2012) (“Copyright law only protects expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.” (quoting
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2010))); see also
Anthony J. Mahajan, Note, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After
ProCD: A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3297, 3301
(1999).
72. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 31–32.
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As to the third and last requirement, a work is “fixed” if it is in any
“tangible medium of expression,” such as in writing or a drawing.73 The
tangible embodiment must be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.”74 If the fixation is made without the
author’s consent, however, such as recording a concert where recording was
prohibited, it will not qualify for copyright protection.75
While the foregoing underscores the expansive scope of the statute, the
requirements it sets forth are quite permissive.76 The first requirement,
originality, is satisfied based on a de minimus standard—so long as the
work is not copied and there is a spark of creativity.77 The second
requirement, work of authorship, encompasses a long and not exhaustive
list of categories, so that virtually any original work can be found to meet
this requirement. The last requirement, fixation, is met so long as any
tangible medium of expression is used, which practically only excludes
conversations and other events not captured via a tangible medium at the
time they occurred. Accordingly, a wide range of works can be copyrighted
under the statute.
b. Statutory Grants and Enforcement
Once an original work of authorship is fixed in tangible form,78 the
statutory requirements of ownership are met and copyright protection is
triggered,79 giving the owner the exclusive right to reproduce,80 distribute
copies,81 publically perform82 or display the work,83 and prepare derivative

73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101. For example, “an unscripted live event, such as a football game, is
ordinarily not eligible for copyright protection. In contrast, a recording of that event is
copyrightable.” LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 11.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 1101; see LAFRANCE, supra note 57, at 12–13.
76. See generally Deborah Kemp, Copyright on Steroids: In Search of an End to
Overprotection, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 795, 805 (2010); Mark E. Dailey, Abstraction,
Filtration, Comparison: The Difficult Task of Defining and Applying an Appropriate
Substantial Similarity Test for Computer Software, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 442 (2001).
77. “Originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require facts be presented in an
innovative or surprising way.” Am. Massage Therapy Ass’n v. Maxwell Petersen Assocs.,
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
78. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
79. Copyright protection automatically attaches to the copyrightable work. STEPHEN
FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 7 (Richard Stim ed., 10th ed. 2008); see LAFRANCE,
supra note 57, at 3 (“Under current law, compliance with formalities is not a prerequisite to
copyright protection. Thus, a work that satisfies § 102 is protected by federal copyright from
the moment it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, without regard to whether it bears
a copyright notice or has been registered.”).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
81. Id. § 106(3).
82. Id. § 106(6).
83. Id. § 106(5).
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works.84 Copyright protection runs for the life of the author plus seventy
years.85 For joint works, the seventy-year term starts to run upon the death
of the last author.86 If the author is unknown, or if the work is a product of
work for hire, protection lasts for 120 years from creation or ninety-five
years from publication, whichever is first to expire.87
The copyright owner may also choose, but is not required, to register the
copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office.88 As long as the certificate of
registration is made before, or within five years of, the work’s first
publication, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the
certificate and the copyright’s validity.89 Registration and subsequent
notice of the copyright is also beneficial to the owner because it gives the
public notice of the protected work, and eliminates the possibility that the
defendant’s liability will be mitigated based on an assertion of innocent
infringement.90
Copyright infringement involves the exercise of a copyright owner’s
exclusive rights without prior authorization.91 The burden of proof in a
copyright infringement claim falls on the plaintiff, who must establish
ownership of a valid copyright and the defendant’s infringement of that
copyright.92 More specifically, the copyright owner must establish three
things: (1) the existence of a valid copyright by proving that the
requirements of § 102(a) are satisfied,93 (2) violation of the owner’s
exclusive right under § 106, and (3) improper appropriation by showing that
the infringer created a “substantially similar” work to the copyrighted
work.94
3. The Misuse Doctrine Puts Copyright Protection in Check
The courts, pursuing a balance between protecting authors and inventors
and enabling market competition, have further shaped and limited the broad
constitutional grant enumerated in Article I and the expansive protections
set forth in Title 17. The copyright misuse defense doctrine is a product of
that pursuit. The misuse defense “has its historical roots in the unclean
hands defense,”95 barring intellectual property owners from recovery when
a defendant affirmatively proves that the culpable plaintiff used the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
2010).
93.
94.
95.

Id. § 106(2).
Id. § 302(a).
Id. § 302(b).
Id. § 302(c).
FISHMAN, supra note 79, at 7.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
Id. § 401(d).
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 419.
Int’l Media Films, Inc. v. Lucas Entm’t, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
See supra Part I.A.2.a.
LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 419–20; see FISHMAN, supra note 79, at 319.
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999).
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protected intellectual property right “to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly not [otherwise] granted.”96
Misusing the copyright does not invalidate it but rather renders it
unenforceable until the misuse has been “purged.”97 This has been
interpreted as requiring that “the improper practice has been abandoned and
that the consequences of the misuse of the patent [or copyright] have been
dissipated.”98 While the copyright is unenforceable due to misuse, any
defendant or potential defendant can affirmatively raise the misuse defense,
even in the absence of any injury or harm.99 In other words, causal
connection between the misuse and the injury is not a required element of
the misuse defense.
The misuse defense is an affirmative defense.100 Briefly, this means that
a defendant invoking the misuse defense concedes infringement if the
copyright use is valid, but asserts that the plaintiff was using its copyright in
an improper way.101
The copyright misuse defense was a logical extension of the patent
misuse defense.102 Patent misuse was first expressly recognized in the 1942
Supreme Court decision, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.103 In
Morton Salt Co., G. S. Suppiger Company licensed its patented saltdepositing machines on the condition that users use the patentee’s own salt
tablets with the leased machines.104 When Morton Salt Company failed to
do so, the patentee brought an infringement claim against Morton Salt
Company seeking an injunction and damages.105 The Supreme Court
refused to grant the patentee relief, reversing the Seventh Circuit’s
decision.106 The Seventh Circuit’s holding was based on the finding that
the tie-in had not “substantially lessened competition or tended to create a
monopoly” and thus did not constitute a violation of antitrust laws.107
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s antitrust approach, the Supreme Court

96. Id. at 793; see infra Part II.
97. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir. 1990).
98. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
99. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978; Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08–03251
WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009).
100. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); David Scher,
Note, The Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 94 (1992).
101. See LEAFFER, supra note 24, at 535.
102. See generally Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973; Charnelle, supra note 17, at 168–74;
Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 565, 570 (2006) (“Copyright misuse
is a [sic] not a new doctrine. It emerged from patent law and has been used by the courts
since the landmark patent misuse case, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.”).
103. 314 U.S. 488.
104. Id. at 490.
105. Id. at 489.
106. Id. at 490.
107. Id.
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purported to apply an “equity rationale,” pursuant to which public policy
“forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to
public policy to grant.”108 Interestingly, the Court did not specify how the
use was “contrary to public policy,” and instead limited its analysis to a
showing that the patent secured a “limited monopoly not granted by the
Patent Office.”109 The Court held that the tying arrangement was an
attempt to “restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, salt
tablets, for use with the patented machines, and [was] aiding in the creation
of a limited monopoly in the tablets not within that granted by the
patent.”110
Though this case arose as an antitrust claim under the Clayton Act, the
Supreme Court decided it in its capacity as a “court of equity,” considering
simply whether the patentee’s action was “contrary to public policy.”111
The Court’s public policy analysis differed in form, but not in function,
from the Seventh Circuit’s antitrust analysis, because both were concerned
with restraints on competition, an antitrust concept.112 While the two courts
seemed to apply different analyses, they actually reached opposing
conclusions based on varying interpretations of the facts. Simply stated, the
Seventh Circuit, applying an antitrust analysis, found that competition was
not restrained. By contrast, the Supreme Court, purporting to apply a public
policy analysis but in fact applying an antitrust analysis, found that
competition was restrained.
Unsurprisingly, this landmark decision, often cited by courts applying
and extending the misuse doctrine, left much uncertainty and confusion for
subsequent courts to weed through.113 This Note addresses how later
decisions, extending to copyrights the misuse doctrine as it was first
articulated in Morton Salt Co., have reached different conclusions as to
whether the antitrust or the public policy approach is appropriate in the
misuse analysis. Furthermore, those applying the latter approach have not
done so with the same public policy considerations in mind.114
This lack of uniformity is exacerbated by the fact that, in the context of
copyrights, the Supreme Court has not expressly approved or upheld the
misuse defense.115 The Supreme Court has, however, suggested in a
108. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 490.
112. G. S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1941), rev’d, 314 U.S.
488 (1942), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
113. See Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards
and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1991) (“Almost immediately,
the relationship between patent misuse doctrine and antitrust law became confused.”).
114. See infra Part II.A.
115. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[N]o United
States Supreme Court decision has firmly established a copyright misuse defense in a
manner analogous to the establishment of the patent misuse defense by Morton Salt.”).
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number of other cases that “the purpose and policy of patent misuse apply
as well to copyright,”116 and has also “given at least tacit approval of the
defense”117 in United States v. Loew’s, Inc.118 In Loew’s, Inc., the
defendants, distributors of copyrighted motion picture feature films,
“conditioned the license or sale of one or more feature films upon the
acceptance by the station of a package or block containing one or more
unwanted or inferior films.”119 The Court, applying an antitrust analysis,
found it “clear that the tying arrangements here both by their ‘inherent
nature’ and by their ‘effect’ injuriously restrained trade” and held that
recovery for infringement should be denied.120 In this decision, the Court
extended the patent misuse doctrine to copyrights, reasoning,
“Accommodation between the statutorily dispensed monopoly in the
combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the
statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent
or copyright monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly
confined.”121 In doing so, the Court implicitly approved, but fell short of
expressly articulating, the copyright misuse defense.122
Nonetheless, the copyright misuse defense has been expressly articulated
by a number of lower courts and was even applied far earlier than its
articulation, as evinced in M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen.123 In this 1948
decision, the plaintiffs, motion picture companies, alleged copyright
infringement by defendants, theater owners, of certain copyrighted musical
compositions.124 The defendants countered that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to relief because they had illegally extended their copyrights and
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.125 Based on the finding that the
plaintiffs had the “power to deny to any theatre owner . . . the right to
Nonetheless, “[t]here is little doubt that copyright misuse will eventually resurface in the
Supreme Court and be reconciled. On this point, lower courts and commentators alike agree;
however, divergent opinions abound as to what should be the proper scope and guiding
principles for copyright misuse.” Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common
Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 888 (2000).
116. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(collecting Supreme Court cases); see Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (“[S]ince copyright and
patent law serve parallel public interests, a ‘misuse’ defense should apply to infringement
actions brought to vindicate either right. . . . Both patent law and copyright law seek to
increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors with the
exclusive rights to their works for a limited time. At the same time, the granted monopoly
power does not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright.”).
117. Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 846.
118. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 38 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
119. Id. at 40.
120. Id. at 49–50 (quoting United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911)).
121. Id. at 49.
122. Charnelle, supra note 17, at 171.
123. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
124. Id. at 844.
125. Id.

96

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

exhibit films containing Ascap music,”126 a right without which “no theatre
owner would be able to stay in business,” the district court held that the
plaintiffs unlawfully extended their copyright monopoly, and thereby
violated the public policy goals of copyright law.127 As a result, the court
also held that “it [was] not necessary to determine whether anti-trust
violations alone would deprive plaintiffs of the right of recovery.”128 By
denying recovery to the copyright owners based on both the defendants’
antitrust contention and the finding that the plaintiffs had illegally extended
their copyrights, the court effectively permitted application of what is
known today as the copyright misuse defense.129
In 1990, the copyright misuse defense was clearly articulated by the
Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.130 In Lasercomb,
the plaintiff, a software program developer, brought an infringement claim
alleging that defendants acted in violation of the standard licensing
agreement, which restricted “licensees from creating any of their own
CAD/CAM die-making software.”131 The court extended the patent misuse
defense to copyrights and explained its rationale as follows:
The origins of patent and copyright law in England, the treatment of these
two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of our Constitution,
and the later statutory and judicial development of patent and copyright
law in this country persuade us that parallel public policies underlie the
protection of both types of intellectual property rights. . . . [T]hese
parallel policies call for application of the misuse defense to copyright as
well as patent law.132

Accordingly, the court held that the broadly restrictive licensing terms
constituted a valid defense of copyright misuse and the plaintiff “should
have been barred . . . from suing for infringement of its copyright.”133
Since then, many district and circuit courts, including the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits, have recognized the
copyright misuse doctrine.134 These courts, however, have not followed a
126. ASCAP is an acronym for the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers. Id. It is a voluntary association that protects performing rights. About ASCAP,
AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2013). The plaintiffs in this case were ASCAP members. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at
844.
127. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 846, 850.
128. Id. at 850.
129. Id. at 846.
130. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 972.
132. Id. at 974. The court further stated that “a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in
the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law.” Id. at 973.
133. Id. at 979.
134. Charnelle, supra note 17, at 171; see Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d
772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976; United Tel. Co. of
Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610–12 (8th Cir. 1988); Saturday Evening Post
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uniform method of analysis in addressing the copyright misuse defense.
This Note discusses the two approaches that have most commonly been
applied by courts: a public policy approach and an antitrust approach.
While the focus of this Note is copyright misuse in the context of tying
arrangements, most of the discussion is also applicable to other areas of
intellectual property law.
B. An Introduction to Antitrust Law
Antitrust law seeks to protect market competition “by setting limits on
the collusive and predatory conduct and monopolistic abuses that free
markets often breed.”135 The sources of antitrust law in the United States
are federal laws, state laws, and judicial jurisprudence. Of most importance
is the Sherman Act, a federal law passed in 1890 in “an effort to codify the
English common law governing restraints of trade and monopolies.”136
Subsequently, a number of federal statutes, like the Clayton Act, and
regulations, promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, were
created.137 These federal antitrust laws clearly signified that “Congress was
dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which
it sought to prevent.”138 In addition, most states have enacted general
antitrust statutes with the Sherman Act as the foundation.139 Finally, as is
often the case with legislation, judicial interpretation has shaped and
defined antitrust law.140
This section provides an overview of the historical context that
necessitated the enactment of the Sherman Act, explains its provisions
applicable to tying arrangements, and ultimately describes the antitrust law
treatment of tying arrangements.

Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1199–1201 (7th Cir. 1987); CBS, Inc. v. Am.
Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 607 F.2d 543, 544–45 (2d Cir. 1979).
135. DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION 2 (2010). “The design of the Sherman Act was intended to restore the balance
between necessary business arrangements having primarily reasonable objectives and
effects, and arrangements which were unduly restrictive and attributable to anticompetitive
motives.” 1 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 240-41 (1980); see also United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, and the
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to
the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”). See generally Ramsey Hanna,
Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 401 (1994).
136. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 8 (2000).
137. BRODER, supra note 135, at 6–7.
138. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) (quoting A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.
v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)).
139. BRODER, supra note 135, at 2.
140. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 136, at 8 (“The broadly worded provisions of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts have invited—indeed required—judicial construction.”).
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1. Brief History: The “Trust” Problem
Gives Birth to Antitrust Laws
American antitrust policies were influenced by English common law
relating to trade and monopolies.141 During the nineteenth century, the old
English common law definition of agreements in “restraint of trade” was
expanded from not-to-compete covenants to “restrictions on trade in
general.”142 This newly defined concept of trade restrictions marked the
beginning of efforts by “American courts [to] mold[] the broadened
doctrine into a useful, if imperfect, general antimonopoly instrument.”143
With respect to public grants of monopolies, England’s Statute of
Monopolies of 1623 represented “the formal culmination of English
opposition to” grants of monopolies which restrained trade; such opposition
later “became an established part of the American tradition.”144
Aside from British influences, the economic climate in the United States
during the latter half of the nineteenth century further pushed the
application of the common law, and brought to light the significance of
laws regulating competitive behaviors.145 During that time period, a
number of businesses and organizations consolidated to create what became
known as “trusts.”146 The trusts were originally formed as means of
protecting competitors from the “[f]ierce cutthroat competition” that
accompanied the laissez-faire era,147 but they ultimately restrained
competition instead by appropriating markets and profits among its
members.148 The states were first to respond to public disapproval of trusts
At least twenty-six states outlawed
and similar agreements.149
arrangements that stifled competition via statutory or constitutional
prohibitions.150 Despite their efforts, the states were unable to adequately
address the nationally reaching “trusts” problem due to a “lack of
coordinated and aggressive public prosecution,”151 as well as “jurisdictional
and legislative limitations.”152 With this background, the Sherman Act was

141. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 36 (1954).
142. WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 7 (3d ed. 1999).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6.
145. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 6–7.
146. See generally JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS: A DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN TRUST MOVEMENT, at xii–xiv (1904).
147. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 80.
148. Id. at 81.
149. Id. at 129; see Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 606 (2012) (“At the turn of the nineteenth century, antitrust
emerged because of the public’s fear of ‘trusts.’”).
150. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 4
(2d ed. 2008).
151. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 142, at 8.
152. Richard E. Donovan, Antitrust Litigation, in COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
STATE COURTS § 89:7 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2010).
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enacted “to supplement . . . the preexisting antitrust enforcement engaged in
by the states.”153
2. The Sherman Act: The Cornerstone of Antitrust Policy
The Sherman Act is named for Republican Senator John Sherman.154
His 1888 resolution was adopted by the Senate without debate155 and
signed by President Benjamin Harrison into law in 1890,156 thereby
producing “the first general statute dealing with the trust problem.”157 The
Sherman Act was formally titled, “An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies.”158 The Act’s original
objectives can be inferred from its formal title, as well as the significant role
its enforcement plays in today’s competitive market.159
Immediately after its passage, the government successfully “curb[ed] the
power and monopolistic abuses of the trusts that had come to dominate the
American economic scene”160 by using “its newfound power to break up
trusts or cartels in the steel, rail, and petroleum industries.”161 Since then,
the aggressiveness of antitrust enforcement has varied in response to the
economic and political climate at any given period.162 Despite such
variations, it is widely accepted today that the Sherman Act is the most
important source of federal statutory authority in antitrust policy.163
The first two sections of the Sherman Act, which are most relevant in the
context of tying arrangements, “contain the substantive matter of the act,
defining the offenses and providing certain penalties.”164 Section 1 states,
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”165 Section 2 prohibits

153. Id.
154. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 166.
155. Id.
156. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 238.
157. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 166.
158. KINTNER, supra note 135, at 125–26.
159. Id.; see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958) (“The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions . . . . [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”).
160. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 142, at 22.
161. BRODER, supra note 135, at 6.
162. See id. at 4.
163. See KINTNER, supra note 135, at 125 (“The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the
cornerstone of American antitrust policy.”).
164. THORELLI, supra note 141, at 221.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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monopolization, attempt, or conspiracy “to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”166
3. The Treatment of Tying Arrangements Under Antitrust Law
Tying arrangements are generally asserted under one or both of the first
two sections of the Sherman Act. Since both of these sections are written in
broad terms, judicial interpretation plays an important role in defining their
Earlier cases evidenced a strong disapproval of tying
reach.167
arrangements. For instance, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States, Justice Harlan stated that
‘tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition.’ They deny competitors free access to the market for the
tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in
another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free
choice between competing products. For these reasons ‘tying agreements
fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.’168

However, courts have subsequently moved away from such strong anti–
tying arrangement views while still maintaining the illegality of these
practices. For example, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,
the Court stated that
not every refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain
competition. If each of the products may be purchased separately in a
competitive market, one seller’s decision to sell the two in a single
package imposes no unreasonable restraint on either market, particularly
if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire package or its
several parts.169

As Jefferson Parish established and later courts upheld, not every
instance of tying is unlawful. Tying arrangements are “an object of
antitrust concern . . . [when they] force buyers into giving up the purchase
of substitutes for the tied product [or] destroy the free access of competing
suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market.”170 In other words,
when a tying arrangement has anticompetitive effects, it is condemned
166. Id. § 2.
167. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 136, at 7. It is also because of this “flexible,
practical approach, by which challenged conduct would be evaluated in light of continuing
experience as to its effect on competition in evolving economic conditions, that the Sherman
Act has retained its essential character and vitality since its enactment.” KINTNER, supra note
135, at 239.
168. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949), and Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953)).
169. 466 U.S. 2, 11–12, (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006).
170. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44–45 (1962) (citation omitted),
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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under antitrust laws “even if one or more of the products in question is
[protected].”171
These arrangements fall under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
forbids agreements that restrain trade or commerce. Because tying
arrangements can exist without restraining trade, “[n]ot all tying agreements
are illegal.”172 Meanwhile, some categories of tying arrangements, at least
in theory, always restrain trade and thus are per se illegal.173 Arrangements
that restrain trade, yet are not per se illegal, are analyzed under the rule of
reason.174
These two legal frameworks, per se illegality and the rule of reason, are
generally applied by courts in determining whether challenged conduct
amounts to an antitrust violation. The alleged unlawful conduct can be
subject to minimal judicial scrutiny under per se illegality, or to a more
searching analysis under the rule of reason.175 While the per se analysis
entails “a conclusive presumption of net anticompetitive effects,” the rule of
reason “requires a court to engage in case-specific evaluation of evidence
bearing on actual or predictable competitive effects.”176
Under both rules, the burden of proof falls on the plaintiff to show that
the challenged agreement or conduct violates the Sherman Act by
In the context of tying
unreasonably restraining competition.177
arrangements, “this burden necessarily involves an inquiry into the actual
effect of the challenged conduct on competition in the” market of the tied
product.178 The defendant has the burden of proof to establish the existence
of a business justification under a rule of reason analysis and any other
affirmative defenses.179
The following subsections further discuss the application of both rules
with respect to tying arrangements. It should be noted that although the
case law discussed in these sections involves patents and not copyrighted
works, this distinction is less of a concern here, where the focus is on the

171. HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 19, at 21–27.
172. BRODER, supra note 135, at 50.
173. Id. at 46, 50.
174. Id. at 51; see also U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1185
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“If the particular licensing arrangement in question is not one of those
specific practices that has been held to constitute per se misuse, it will be analyzed under the
rule of reason.”). See generally Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique
of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 607 (2012).
175. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 50–51. See generally Markham, supra note 174, at
593.
176. Markham, supra note 174, at 593.
177. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Moore v. James H.
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977).
178. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 90 (2009).
179. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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methods of analyses generally utilized in antitrust law and not on the
specific intellectual property at issue.
a. The Per Se Rule
Trade restraints are per se illegal only if they constitute a “naked
restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except [the] stifling of competition.”180
Justice Marshall explained the rationale behind the per se rule as follows:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified
on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far
outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will
result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the
administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the
practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If
the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then
they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.181

Per se analysis is not commonly applied by courts and is limited to cases
where “experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”182 Even
when the per se analysis is applied, “‘considerable inquiry into market
conditions’ may be required before . . . condemnation is justified.”183 For a
tying agreement to constitute a per se violation, the plaintiff must establish
four elements:184 (1) the products or services are separate,185 (2) the sale or
licensing of one product is conditioned on the sale or licensing of another
product,186 (3) the seller has sufficient economic power in the tying

180. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)); see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (1983)
(“[T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely
enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose
restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other.”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977) (holding that per se rules are “appropriate
only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive”).
181. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
182. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see also Broad.
Music, 441 U.S. at 9–10 (“[I]t is only after considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.”).
183. Markham, supra note 174, at 610; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“[W]hile the court has spoken of a ‘per se’ rule against
tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications
that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis.”).
184. See JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN, MAUREEN MCGUIRL, RALPH
FOLSOM & FRANK FINE, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 22.02[1] (2d ed. 2012).
185. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir.
1976); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer Support Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951
(W.D.N.C. 2000).
186. See Abercrombie v. Lum’s Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Hammond
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 39 F.R.D. 604, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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product’s market to be able to enforce the tie-in,187 and (4) a “not
insubstantial” amount of commerce in the tied product’s market is
foreclosed.188 As to the third element, requiring market power,189 some
courts have endorsed a more searching analysis, requiring proof of power in
the relevant market or presence of a tie-in between an unpatented and a
patented product before concluding that the arrangement is unlawful.190
Further, in practice, the fourth requirement providing “that the tie must
affect a substantial volume of commerce in the tied-product market is
virtually always met, even where the volume of affected commerce is
slight.”191
International Salt Co. v. United States192 provides an example of the
application of the per se analysis. In International Salt Co., the government
brought an action against International Salt, patent owner “on two machines
for utilization of salt products.”193 The government alleged that the
restriction in the leases requiring “lessees to purchase from [International]
all unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in the leased machines”
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.194 Based on the finding that the
contracts at issue affected a volume of business that “cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial,” and the rationale that it “is unreasonable, per
se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market,” the Court held
that “International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents
afford no immunity from the antitrust laws.”195
b. The Rule of Reason
Although the per se analysis may provide for greater administrative
convenience, courts more frequently engage in the searching rule of reason
analysis.196 The rule of reason requires a determination of whether the
practice’s procompetitive aspects outweigh its anticompetitive harm.197
The plaintiff must “do far more to prove the unreasonableness of the alleged

187. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–79
(1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958). Note that in contrast to a
per se analysis, under the rule of reason a tying violation may be established despite the
absence of this element. See infra Part I.B.3.b.
188. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14–22 (1984), abrogated
by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at
5–6.
189. Also called “monopoly power.” See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 466.
190. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 43.
191. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse As Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 501 (2011).
192. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
193. Id. at 394.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 396.
196. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed
under a ‘rule of reason.’”).
197. See BRODER, supra note 135, at 51–52.
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practice than where the allegations involve per se illegality.”198 Ultimately,
the factfinder “must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
conditions before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s
history, nature, and effect.”199 In Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States, the Court explained the factors and information to be considered as
follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts.200

Furthermore, some courts have held that a rule of reason violation can be
established in the absence of market power, a requirement for per se
illegality, so long as the plaintiff can prove sufficient anticompetitive
impact in the tied product.201 The rule of reason analysis is also
distinguishable from the per se rule in that it allows the proponent of the
alleged tying arrangement “to argue that she had a legitimate business
For instance, the business
justification for imposing a tie-in.”202
justification functions as a defense to the misuse doctrine under a rule of
reason analysis, excusing the copyright owner’s misuse so long as it was
motivated by a legitimate purpose.203
Essentially, the underlying rationale behind the rule of reason analysis is
that a single factor is not decisive on its own, but “[r]ather, the fact finder
‘weighs all of the circumstances’ in deciding whether the challenged
198. Id. at 51.
199. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
200. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“The rule of reason is the
accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1. ‘Under
this rule, the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.’ Appropriate factors to take into account include ‘specific information about the
relevant business’ and ‘the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. Whether the businesses
involved have market power is a further, significant consideration.” (citations omitted)
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977), and State Oil
Co., 522 U.S. at 10)).
201. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262–63 (1963); N. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1958).
202. CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (2011).
203. See Times Herald Printing Co. v. A.H. Belo Corp., 820 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. App.
1991).
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practice is, on balance, competitively unreasonable.”204 Nonetheless,
despite attempts to define the rule of reason, many questions remain
unsettled. For instance, it is “unclear whether, and at what stage of the case
a plaintiff is required to establish market power,” and whether the
anticompetitive effects can be merely theoretical.205
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH VERSUS
THE ANTITRUST APPROACH
More than two decades since the copyright misuse doctrine was first
recognized explicitly in Lasercomb, a uniform approach to determining
whether a specific behavior constitutes misuse still does not exist. A tying
arrangement can give rise to the copyright misuse defense either because it
violates copyright principles as framed by the Constitution, or because it
violates federal and state antitrust principles. This Note seeks to highlight
the shortfalls of each of these commonly applied approaches through a
discussion of selected copyright misuse cases.
A. The Application of the Public Policy Approach
The public policy approach is the more prominent method of evaluating
copyright misuse. Under this approach, the misuse defense “continue[s] to
be available against conduct that violates antitrust law,” but is also
“available for practices that undermine [intellectual property] policies
without violating antitrust law.”206 This section discusses four landmark
cases in which the courts have applied the public policy approach in
evaluating copyright misuse.
1. Fourth Circuit: Defense Prevails
The Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb clearly underscored the independence
of copyright misuse from antitrust principles. In this case, the court stated
that

204. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10
(2012–2013 ed. 2012).
205. Markham, supra note 174, at 638 (“Possibly the most important turn of events in a
rule of reason case is when the judge decides whether a plaintiff’s burden includes proof of
market power, yet the case law is inconsistent as to whether and when proof of market power
is a requisite element of a plaintiff’s antitrust conspiracy case.”); see HOLMES &
MANGIARACINA, supra note 204, § 2:10 (“The courts appear to be currently split on whether
proof of actual anticompetitive effects such as supracompetitive prices, reduced output, or
diminished service quality is required to prove a violation of the rule of reason, or whether it
is enough to show a substantial risk of anticompetitive effects in light of the defendants’
market power and the nature and market context of the challenged conduct.”).
206. Bohannan, supra note 191, at 478; see also Charnelle, supra note 17, at 177 (“[T]he
[misuse] doctrine is broader than antitrust law and principles so that it can provide a defense
to copyright infringement even in cases where the misuse of the copyright would not violate
antitrust laws and principles.”).
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while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust
law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the
converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation of
antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement
action. The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement
is “reasonable”), but whether the copyright is being used in a manner
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.207

Accordingly, the court plainly rejected reliance on the “‘rule of reason’
concept of antitrust law,”208 and instead endorsed the public policy
approach.209 The court stated that the Constitution gave Congress the
power to create copyright laws in order to promote progress,210 and thus
using the copyright in a manner which inhibits progress violates copyright
law’s underlying public policy.211 In Lasercomb, the licensing agreement
inhibited progress by prohibiting licensees from creating new software
which in return prevented “new ideas and knowledge” from being
introduced “into the public domain.”212 This restriction was therefore
found to be a misuse of the copyright pursuant to the public policy
analysis.213
While Lasercomb involved restrictive licensing and not a tying
arrangement, it is important to note that “the reasoning of Lasercomb does
not turn on the particular type of anti-competitive behavior alleged,”214 and
was later cited by courts applying the public policy approach to the
copyright misuse defense in the context of tying arrangements.215 Most
importantly, Lasercomb makes clear that the balance between increasing
“the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors
with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time,” and limiting that
“granted monopoly power” by ensuring that it does not “extend to property
not covered by the . . . copyright,” is necessary in order to hold true to the
framers’ purpose of promoting progress.216 Where that balance lies is often
determinative of how a court applying the public policy approach will rule
on the copyright misuse defense.

207. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added).
208. Id. at 977 (“If, as it appears, the district court analogized from the ‘rule of reason’
concept of antitrust law, we think its reliance on that principle was misplaced.”).
209. Id. at 975.
210. Id. (“In giving Congress the power to create copyright and patent laws, the framers
combined the two concepts in one clause, stating a unitary purpose—to promote progress.”).
211. Id. at 979.
212. Id. at 975.
213. Id. at 979.
214. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169–70 (1st Cir.
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
215. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); infra Part II.B.2.b.
216. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
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2. Ninth Circuit: Defense Prevails
The Ninth Circuit tracked Lasercomb’s application of the public policy
approach in Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical
Ass’n.217 In Practice Management, the American Medical Association
(AMA) licensed its copyrighted publication of the Physician’s Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT) on the condition that the federal agency,
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), would not use any other
competing coding system.218 Practice Management, a publisher and
distributor of medical reference works, brought suit claiming that the AMA
misused its copyright by entering into that agreement.219 In its opinion, the
court did not explicitly use tying language and instead referred to the issue
in terms of the “exclusivity requirement”;220 nonetheless, the licensing
agreement is an example of a tying arrangement, or more specifically a tieout, as evidenced by the fact that the AMA licensed its CPT only on the
condition that the HCFA would not use any other coding system.221
In determining whether the AMA’s licensing terms constituted copyright
misuse, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s determination
in Lasercomb, rejected the argument that the defendant must “prove an
antitrust violation to prevail.”222 The court subsequently held that “Practice
Management established its misuse defense” because it demonstrated that
the AMA’s use of the copyright violated public policy.223 The Ninth
Circuit, however, departed from the view of the Fourth Circuit as to what
public policy entails.
In contrast with Lasercomb, Practice Management did not emphasize the
importance of promoting progress or address how a copyright should not be
used in a manner that interferes with that goal. While the court came close
to expressing similar goals in stating that “copyrightability of the CPT
provides the economic incentive for the AMA to produce and maintain the
CPT,” and destroying it could “prove destructive of the copyright interest,
in encouraging creativity,”224 it ultimately found a violation of public
policy on different grounds. The court stated:
What offends the copyright misuse doctrine is . . . the limitation imposed
by the AMA licensing agreement on HCFA’s rights to decide whether or
not to use other forms as well. Conditioning the license on HCFA’s

217. 121 F.3d at 521 (“We agree with the Fourth Circuit that a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse
defense.”).
218. Id. at 517.
219. Id. at 518.
220. Id. at 521.
221. Id. at 518.
222. Id. at 521.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 518 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 5.06[C], at 5-92 (1996)).
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promise not to use competitors’ products constituted a misuse of the
copyright by the AMA.
. . . The terms under which the AMA agreed to license use of the CPT to
HCFA gave the AMA a substantial and unfair advantage over its
competitors. By agreeing to license the CPT in this manner, the AMA
used its copyright “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in
the grant of a copyright.”225

Therefore, it can be inferred that in the view of the Ninth Circuit,
behavior amounts to a public policy violation if limitations are imposed on
the licensee and if the copyright holder consequently gains a “substantial
and unfair advantage over its competitors.”226 Interestingly, neither
Lasercomb nor the constitutional copyright grant mentions the effects of the
copyright use, or misuse, on competitors.
The Practice Management approach, nevertheless, is readily
distinguishable from the antitrust rule of reason approach. First, the court
did not appear to be balancing the procompetitive against the
anticompetitive effects of the licensing agreement, either directly or
indirectly. In fact, the court did not recognize any procompetitive aspects
of the agreement at all. Further, under a rule of reason analysis, the court
would take “into account a variety of factors, including specific information
about the relevant business, its conditions before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”227 The court here,
however, did not contemplate a number of factors, but in contrast opined,
“The controlling fact is that HCFA is prohibited from using any other
coding system.”228 Most importantly, the court did not decide, or seek to
decide, whether the agreement imposed an “unreasonable restraint on
competition.”229
A finding that a behavior results in a “substantial and unfair advantage”
over competitors, as the court found here, is not dispositive of the presence
of unreasonable restraints on competition.230 If a competitor is at a
disadvantage because, for example, its product is inferior, the court would
surely not find a restraint on competition based on that fact alone.
Similarly, being at a disadvantage as a result of a competitor’s tying
arrangement does not translate into a finding of a restraint on competition.
More precisely, a disadvantage in competing is not equivalent to a restraint
on others’ ability to compete or to enter the market altogether.

225.
1990)).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 521 (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir.
Id.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 521.
State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 521.
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3. Fifth Circuit: Defense Prevails
In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., the plaintiff, Alcatel
(formerly DSC Communications Corporation (DSC)), possessed copyright
protection for the operating system software which controlled the switches
it designed and manufactured for long-distance telephone service
providers.231 The licensing agreement of the copyrighted software
prohibited the customer “from copying the software or disclosing it to third
parties,” and authorized the software’s use “only in conjunction with DSCmanufactured equipment.”232 DSC brought suit alleging that despite the
licensing terms, as a way of expanding the call-handling capacity of
switches, DGI illegally copied DSC’s operating system code.233 In
response, DGI asserted copyright misuse as a defense.234
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized Lasercomb’s approach, stating
that “the public policy which includes original works within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the original
expression.”235 Pursuant to that rationale, the court held that “despite the
jury’s finding that DGI acted with unclean hands in its acquisition and use
of DSC’s copyrighted software,” it was not “barred from invoking an
equitable defense”236 of copyright misuse and “[a] reasonable juror could
conclude, based on the licensing agreement, that ‘DSC ha[d] used its
copyrights to indirectly gain commercial control over products DSC d[id]
not have copyrighted.’”237 The court reached this holding after a detailed
discussion of how the agreement inhibited DGI from creating its own
software. For example, the court opined:
Despite the presence of some evidence . . . that DGI could have developed
its own software, there was also evidence that it was not technically
feasible to use a non-DSC operating system because the switch has a
‘common control’ scheme in which each microprocessor card in a
network of such cards runs the same operating system. Hence, without
the freedom to test its cards in conjunction with DSC’s software, DGI was
effectively prevented from developing its product, thereby securing for
DSC a limited monopoly over its uncopyrighted microprocessor cards.238

The court thus acknowledged that DGI may not have been completely
prevented from creating its own software, but found it sufficient that there
was evidence suggesting that it was not technically feasible for DGI to do
so. If an action is not technically feasible, then a competitor is unlikely to

231. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 778.
234. Id. at 792.
235. Id. at 793 (quoting jury instructions from DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc.,
898 F. Supp. 1183 (1995)).
236. Id. at 794.
237. Id. at 793.
238. Id. at 794.
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pursue it, and in return, the public domain will be deprived of the
additional, and potentially superior, product. Essentially, the determinative
point in this case was that the licensing agreement violated the public policy
of promoting progress and immobilized “[t]he purpose of copyright law
[which] is to promote and protect creativity.”239 Accordingly, in Alcatel,
the court’s framing of the public policy analysis mirrored that of
Lasercomb.240 Interestingly, in Alcatel, the possibility of engaging in an
antitrust analysis of the misuse defense was not even proposed, which
reflects the court’s strong adherence to the public policy approach.
4. Ninth Circuit: Defense Fails
Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp.241 is a recent case where the interpretation of
the relationship between the misuse defense and antitrust principles was
determinative of the outcome. In the interest of clarity, this Note breaks the
Apple Inc. litigation into three stages: the first stage covers the district
court’s finding as to Psystar’s motion for leave to amend in order to assert
counterclaims under the misuse doctrine (Apple I);242 the second stage
briefly summarizes the district court’s ruling on the misuse defense (Apple
II);243 and, the third and final stage discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision
regarding the district court’s rejection of Psystar’s misuse defense (Apple
III).244
This series of litigation commenced when Apple Inc. (Apple), the
exclusive manufacturer and master licensor of the OS X operating system,
asserted, among other claims, copyright infringement against Psystar Corp.
(Psystar), the manufacturer and distributor of a tailored line of computers,
for the unauthorized use of its computer operating system.245 Psystar
Apple
counterclaimed, initially asserting antitrust violations.246
successfully moved to dismiss those counterclaims.247
Subsequently, in Apple I, Psystar moved for leave to amend in order to
assert counterclaims under the copyright misuse doctrine.248 The basis for

239. Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
240. See Charnelle, supra note 17, at 187–88 (“The court’s reasoning was consistent with
the reasoning behind Lasercomb because in both cases, the court found misuse where the
copyright owner restricted the creative efforts of its licensees in developing competitive
software resulting in an unlawful extension of the copyright grant. In addition, public
welfare would be harmed and progress constrained because DGI would be prevented from
advancing technology by developing better microprocessor cards.”).
241. 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
242. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., No. C 08-03251 WHA, 2009 WL 303046, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 6, 2009).
243. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 658
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
244. Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1152.
245. Apple Inc., 2009 WL 303046, at *1.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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Psystar’s misuse defense was rooted in the allegation that Apple had
wrongfully “leveraged its Mac OS copyrights in order to gain exclusive
rights with respect to Mac OS-compatible computer hardware systems . . .
via its End User License Agreements (EULA), which specifically required
the consumers to install Mac OS only on Apple-labeled computers.”249
More precisely, Psystar contended that the tying of the software to the
hardware constituted a misuse of Apple’s copyright of the Mac OS
software.
In ruling on the narrow issue of whether Psystar’s counterclaims could be
amended, the district court quoted the Ninth Circuit in Practice
Management, stating that “a defendant in a copyright infringement suit need
not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse defense.”250
Finding that the previous order addressed the antitrust but not the copyright
claims, the district court granted Psystar’s motion, allowing it to assert the
copyright misuse doctrine as an affirmative defense to Apple’s infringement
claim.251
A few months later, the same judge, sitting for the same court, ruled that
Psystar could not prevail on the misuse defense and granted Apple’s motion
for summary judgment in Apple II.252 Although the district court
recognized the public policy rationale underlying the copyright grant, it
found the case before it distinguishable from Practice Management on the
ground that, while the copyright holder in Practice Management limited the
use of competitors’ coding systems, “Apple ha[d] not prohibited purchasers
of Mac OS X from using competitor’s products. Rather, Apple ha[d]
simply prohibited purchasers from using Mac OS X on competitor’s
products.”253 The court further held that “Apple ha[d] not prohibited others
from independently developing and using their own operating systems.
Thus, Apple did not violate the public policy underlying copyright law or
engage in copyright misuse.”254
Psystar appealed to the Ninth Circuit in Apple III, asserting that by
requiring the licensees to run their copies only on Apple computers, the
licensing agreement tied the use of Apple’s software to its hardware, and
thus should have been found to be “an unlawful attempt to extend copyright
protection to products that are not copyrightable.”255 The court, however,
was more persuaded by Apple’s response, in which it asserted “that to
adequately demonstrate copyright misuse, Psystar must show either that the

249. Id.
250. Id. at *2 (quoting Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521
(9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998)).
251. Apple Inc., 2009 WL 303046, at *4.
252. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 658
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
253. Id. at 940.
254. Id. at 939.
255. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
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license agreement restricts creativity or that it restricts competition.”256
Applying this proposition to the facts, the court held that the license
agreement did not restrict creativity or competition because “Psystar [was]
free to develop both competing hardware and software,”257 and
subsequently affirmed the granting of summary judgment on Psystar’s
copyright misuse defense.258
The court’s analysis in this case reflects a hybrid approach to the
copyright misuse defense. The court’s ruling permits the finding of misuse
under two conditions: (1) if the licensing agreement restricts creativity; or
(2) if the licensing agreement restricts competition.259 The first condition is
consistent with the rulings in both Lasercomb and Alcatel where the public
policy interest was phrased in terms of promoting progress, and
undoubtedly restricting creativity would dampen that interest.
As to the second condition, it seems to build on the Ninth Circuit’s prior
decision in Practice Management where the court found the copyright’s
“substantial and unfair advantage over its competitors” to be violative of the
public policy embodied in the copyright grant.260 The court in Apple III
takes another step in the direction of an antitrust analysis through the use of
a more encompassing concept—restricting competition.
Apple III can be compared to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United
Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co.261 In both cases, the
misuse defense did not prevail because the tying arrangement did not
“eliminate the possibility of . . . alternative method[s]” and consequently
did not restrain competition.262 In United Telephone, the court clearly
applied a rule of reason analysis. In contrast, in Apple III, the court’s
explicit reference to the public policy approach despite concurrently
applying more of a rule of reason analysis, has further complicated an
already perplexing defense.
By articulating two separate and distinguishable bases for a tying
arrangement to give rise to a prevailing copyright misuse defense, the court
broadens the scope of such a defense. As Apple III illustrates, however, the
facts can be narrowly interpreted so that the defense ultimately fails. This
point is best illustrated by examining how the Ninth Circuit in Apple III
distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Alcatel to reach an opposite
conclusion on a factually similar case. In Apple III, the Ninth Circuit
stated:

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
261. United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); see
infra Part II.B.2.
262. United Tel. Co., 855 F.2d at 612.
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Unlike the licensing agreement in Alcatel, Apple’s SLA [Software
License Agreement] does not restrict competitor’s ability to develop their
own software, nor does it preclude customers from using non-Apple
components with Apple computers. Instead, Apple’s SLA merely
restricts the use of Apple’s own software to its own hardware. As the
district court properly concluded, Apple’s SLA has ‘not prohibited others
from independently developing and using their own operating
systems.’263

However, the agreement in Alcatel provided, in relevant part, that “the
customers [were] authorized to use the software only in conjunction with
DSC-manufactured equipment.”264 As such, it did not expressly prohibit or
restrict a competitor’s ability to develop their own software, but implicitly
did so because it was “not technically feasible to use a non-DSC operating
system . . . . [and] without the freedom to test its cards in conjunction with
DSC’s software, DGI was effectively prevented from developing its
product.”265
Analogously, in Apple III, the licensing agreement which provided, in
relevant part, that a user “agree[s] not to install, use or run the Apple
Software on any non-Apple labeled computer, or to enable others to do
so,”266 did not expressly prohibit competitors from creating their own
software or limit the use of competitors’ hardware altogether. It implicitly
created such a limitation, however, because developing software is not an
easy task, and it is at least conceivable that it might not have been
technically feasible, or even possible, for Psystar to simply just develop its
own “competing hardware and software.”267
Nonetheless, it can be argued that even under a stricter application of
Alcatel, Apple’s SLA would not have violated public policy based solely on
the rationale that the ability to use Apple’s software with the competitor’s
hardware would have given the consumers greater options. Rather, it is
probable that the defendant raising the defense would still need to prove
that the restrictive agreement interfered with the goal of increasing “the
store of human knowledge”268 or encouraging creativity pursuant to the
underlying goals of the copyright grant.
B. The Application of the Antitrust Approach
Other courts evaluate copyright misuse in tying arrangements under
antitrust principles. Pursuant to that approach, the analysis proceeds as it
would if the claim had been brought as an antitrust violation. Thus, as
explained in Part I.B., the court would likely apply an antitrust rule of

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1160.
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 794.
Apple Inc., 658 F.3d at 1155.
Id. at 1152.
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
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reason analysis, and while it may take into account public policy arguments,
the core of the analysis would likely be focused on antitrust principles, such
as restraints on competition and the existence of monopoly power.269
1. Seventh Circuit: Defense Fails
The Seventh Circuit has strongly advocated for the antitrust approach to
intellectual property misuse.270 In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,
USM brought an action alleging that the patentee, SPS, “committed patent
misuse by including a differential royalty schedule in the license agreement
entered into as part of [an earlier] settlement.”271 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the public policy approach altogether, stating that it is “too vague a
formulation to be useful; taken seriously it would put all patent rights at
hazard.”272
In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., one of the issues
the Seventh Circuit addressed was whether a no-contest clause in a
licensing agreement, prohibiting the defendant from challenging the validity
of the plaintiff’s copyright, constituted copyright misuse.273 To avoid
setting forth a federal common law that would run afoul of the Sherman
Act,274 the court held, “What is needed is a balancing of the pros and cons
of the clause in each case . . . [which] is best done under antitrust law.”275
The court then opined that it is unlikely that a copyright “would confer an
economically significant monopoly, one that would raise the price of the
monopolized good well above, and depress its output well below, the
competitive level,”276 and concluded that “a no-contest clause in a
copyright licensing agreement is valid unless shown to violate antitrust
law.”277 The court further stated:
‘If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by
what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative
concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the date to try to
develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders
to debilitating uncertainty.’ This point applies with even greater force to
copyright misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less.278

Although USM Corp. did not involve a copyright or a direct tying
arrangement and Saturday Evening Post Co. did not involve a tying
arrangement, it can be reasonably inferred from both cases that the Seventh
269. See supra Part I.B.3.
270. See, e.g., Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200
(7th Cir. 1987); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
271. USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510.
272. Id.
273. Saturday Evening Post Co., 816 F.2d at 1193.
274. Id. at 1200.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1199.
277. Id. at 1200.
278. Id. (quoting USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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Circuit would likely apply an antitrust analysis if presented with a copyright
misuse defense arising out of a tying arrangement. This is evident by the
court’s antitrust analysis in both cases, strong opposition to the public
policy approach in USM Corp., and fear of creating a “federal common law
rule that would jostle uncomfortably with the Sherman Act.”279
Further, it can be inferred from the court’s assertion that “the danger of
monopoly is less”280 with copyrights than it is with patents that the court
views copyrights and the threats posed on the market by copyright misuse
as being less significant than those posed by patents. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to assume that in the context of copyrights the Seventh Circuit is
unlikely to provide a defendant raising a misuse defense greater means—
such as would be provided under a public policy approach—of escaping
liability from the infringement claim than it allowed in the context of
patents.
2. Eighth Circuit: Defense Fails
In United Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co.,281 the
Eighth Circuit applied an antitrust analysis after acknowledging the
copyright misuse defense. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff, a
publisher of white pages directories, misused the copyright by tying the
“the purchase of the new entries . . . to the purchase of its entire 1985
customer list.”282 The court held that because United Telephone’s license
to reproduce its white pages listings did not “eliminate the possibility of an
alternative method of updating Johnson’s city directories,”283 United
Telephone did not “misuse[] its copyright by restraining competition.”284
Hence, the court reached a holding based on traditional antitrust principles
by applying a rule of reason test that considered other alternatives and
restraints on competition.
3. First Circuit: Defense Fails
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., Data
General Corporation (DG) brought a claim against Grumman Systems
Support Corporation (Grumman) for copyright infringement of its
MV/Advanced Diagnostic Executive System (ADEX), “a new software
diagnostic for [DG’s] MV computers.”285 Based on undisputed evidence
establishing Grumman’s illicit copying of ADEX, the lower court granted

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
282. Id. at 610.
283. Id. at 612.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1154 (1st Cir.
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
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summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim in favor of DG.286
Grumman appealed, contending “that the district court prematurely
One of
dismissed its affirmative defenses and counterclaims.”287
Grumman’s affirmative defenses asserted that “DG [was] not entitled to
enforce its copyrights . . . because it has ‘misused’ those property rights” by
tying access to ADEX to the purchase of its aftermarket service, an “anticompetitive behavior in violation of federal antitrust laws.”288 The First
Circuit, however, found the misuse defense to be “devoid of merit” because
of a lack of sufficient “evidence to justify a trial on . . . Grumman’s antitrust
counterclaims.”289 While the court acknowledged Lasercomb’s public
policy approach,290 it did not inquire into the public policy rationales
underlying copyright laws that may have been implicated in this case. By
limiting its analysis to antitrust law, the court implicitly ruled that the
misuse defense is predicated on a finding of an antitrust violation.
In summary, the cases analyzed above demonstrate the lack of a uniform
approach to the copyright misuse analysis. These cases also suggest that
under the antitrust analysis, the misuse defense is less likely to prevail
because any behavior that does not harm competition would not amount to
a misuse. Thus, the approach applied by the court is crucial because it is
often determinative of the defendant’s fate in the infringement litigation.
Further, while much overlapping exists between the public policy and
antitrust approaches, the two bodies of law underlying those approaches are
rooted in different policy rationales and should not be confined to each
other’s legal boundaries.291
Consequently, a strict application of the antitrust approach in evaluating
copyright misuse is inadequate because it fails to account for behaviors that
do not restrict competition but work in opposition to public policy
rationales embedded in copyright law, whether defined as encouraging
creativity, improving public welfare, or the like. At the same time,

286. Id. at 1155 (“It is essentially undisputed that Grumman technicians used and
duplicated copies of ADEX left behind by DG field engineers. There is also uncontroverted
evidence that Grumman actually acquired copies of ADEX in this manner in order to
maintain libraries of diagnostics so that Grumman technicians could freely duplicate and use
any copy of ADEX to service any of Grumman’s customers with DG’s MV computers.”).
287. Id. at 1152.
288. Id. at 1169.
289. Id. at 1170.
290. Id. at 1169–70 (recognizing that the Lasercomb court did not require proof of an
antitrust violation for a successful misuse defense). For further discussion of Lasercomb, see
supra Part II.A.2.
291. See Saami Zain, Misuse of Misuse: Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission
and the Federal Circuit’s Misguided Patent Misuse Jurisprudence, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 95,
98–99 (2011) (“Antitrust is concerned primarily with protecting unfettered competition in
markets for the purpose of benefitting consumers by lowering prices and/or increasing
output, as well as providing incentives to innovate. Antitrust thereby proscribes conduct that
harms, or is likely to harm, competition or the competitive process. While antitrust and
misuse share certain policy goals (e.g., innovation, preventing abuses of patent power to
harm competition), their goals and concerns are not entirely coextensive.”).
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application of the public policy approach has been ambiguous and
perplexing.292 Part III explores these inadequacies in greater detail to
underscore the need for a different, and better structured, approach.
III. A THREE-TIERED EVALUATIVE APPROACH TO
A BETTER-DEFINED PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
This section first discusses the inadequacies of both the public policy and
antitrust approaches to the copyright misuse analysis in the context of tying
arrangements. Subsequently, a three-tiered approach to the analysis is
proposed which ratchets up and reframes the public policy approach. The
proposed approach is aimed at achieving uniformity without sacrificing the
important underlying goals of copyright and antitrust laws.
A. The Public Policy Approach Yields Inconsistent Results
Since a party prevailing on a copyright misuse defense can escape
infringement liability, the outcome of the case often depends on the court’s
ruling on the misuse defense. As previously outlined,293 however, a
uniform approach to evaluating this important defense is lacking,294 and
even courts that purport to be applying the same approach have reached
opposing results due to inconsistent determinations of what is violative of
public policy.295 For instance, both the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel and the
Ninth Circuit in Apple Inc. evaluated the misuse from a public policy
perspective.296 Both cases concerned scenarios where the tying product
was software and the tied product was manufactured by the copyright
holder.297 Yet the two circuits reached different holdings with respect to
whether the tying arrangement constitutes copyright misuse.298
Further, drawing from the cases discussed in Part II, three types of tying
arrangements that can give rise to misuse under the public policy approach
can be extracted: (1) arrangements that inhibit progress or discourage
creativity,299 (2) arrangements which confer substantial and unfair
advantage on the copyright holder,300 and (3) arrangements that either

292. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (explaining that that the public policy approach “is often difficult to apply and
inevitably requires courts to rely on antitrust principles or language to some degree”).
293. See supra Part II.
294. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 115, at 897–900 (discussing the “two
seemingly divergent approaches to assessing misuse (antitrust-based copyright misuse and
public policy-based copyright misuse)”).
295. See generally supra Part II.A.
296. See supra Part II.A.3–4.
297. See supra Part II.A.3–4.
298. See supra Part II.A.3–4.
299. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Lasercomb
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); supra Part II.A.1, 3.
300. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); supra Part II.A.2.
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restrict creativity or competition.301 Despite the potential appeal associated
with the varying understandings of public policy, ultimately, the public
policy approach provides no certainty to litigators. This is due to the fact
that judicial discretion plays a crucial role in defining “public policy”302
and in determining the factors amounting to an expansion of the granted
right, as evident in the cases discussed.303
In the absence of a Supreme Court decision, courts have no guidance,
aside from their subjective preferences, in deciding which public policy
approach to apply. Even more disconcerting is the present uncertainty
regarding whether the public policy approach is appropriate to the copyright
misuse analysis in the first place. Furthermore, a strict application of the
public policy approach disregards the fact that tying arrangements, by
definition, reshape competition with respect to the products that are part of
the arrangement and thus inevitably trigger antitrust principles.304 It is no
surprise that “misuse has been criticized as being too vague and lacking
coherence in both application and policy.”305
B. The Antitrust Approach Does Not Satisfy Policies
Embedded in Copyright Law
The antitrust approach does not achieve anything beyond the bounds of
antitrust law. In large part this is because antitrust law is confined to the
antitrust framework, which is narrower in both scope and perspective than
the intellectual property framework.306 Copyright protection “is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”307 Antitrust law, in
contrast, is concerned with promoting and maintaining healthy market
competition.308 Accordingly, copyright misuse should not be limited to the
scope of antitrust law.
Three plausible scenarios where the misuse defense could fail under the
antitrust analysis approach but prevail under a public policy approach
further illustrate the independence of the copyright misuse doctrine from
antitrust principles.309 First, the copyright owner may exercise control over

301. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).
302. See supra Part II.A.
303. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part I.B.3.
305. Zain, supra note 291, at 96.
306. See Charnelle, supra note 17, at 177 (“[The copyright misuse] doctrine is broader
than antitrust law and principles so that it can provide a defense to copyright infringement
even in cases where the misuse of the copyright would not violate antitrust laws and
principles.”).
307. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
308. See generally Hanna, supra note 135, at 420; supra Part I.B.
309. See supra Part II.A.1 for the proposition that copyright misuse is independent from
antitrust principles.
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areas outside the scope of the granted copyright monopoly, but without
such control amounting to an antitrust claim. Under antitrust laws,
establishing market power in the tying market is a requirement for per se
illegality and an important factor in weighing the anticompetitive against
the procompetitive effects in a rule of reason analysis.310 Thus, a finding of
market power is often indicative, or at least substantially indicative, of
anticompetitive trade restraints in violation of the Sherman Act.311
However, it is unlikely that a copyright will gain enough market power312
to meet the searching scrutiny of antitrust laws because multiple similar
copyrights can often lawfully coexist in the relevant market so long as each
work is “independently created . . . [and] possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity.”313 Accordingly, under some circumstances, a misuse
of the copyright might fail to meet the requirements of antitrust law even
though such use undermines the policies behind copyright law.314 The
public policy approach, by asking a different question, prevents such
misuses from going unaccounted for in a copyright infringement claim.
In the second scenario, the defendant may fail to, or simply decide not to,
assert an antitrust violation as a basis for the misuse defense. As the court
in Data General Corp. acknowledged, “it is often more difficult to prove an
antitrust violation when the claim rests on the questionable market power
associated with a copyright” and the defendant might not be able to meet
the necessary burden of proof.315
In the third scenario, the defendant might rely solely on asserting
antitrust violations in raising the misuse defense and still fail as a result of
the court’s finding that antitrust laws have not been violated.316 For
example, in Data General Corp., Grumman based its misuse defense solely
on the alleged anticompetitive tying arrangement underlying the antitrust
counterclaims, and the court dismissed the copyright misuse as a result of
insufficient evidence as to the antitrust counterclaims.317
In each of these three scenarios, the public policy approach inquiring into
whether the plaintiff expanded “the statutory copyright monopoly in order

310. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–79
(1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958); see Charnelle, supra note
17, at 191 (“Antitrust violations often rest on the notion of finding market power, which
requires a finding of a specified market share in the defined, relevant market.”). See generally
supra Part I.B.3.a–b.
311. See generally Charnelle, supra note 17, at 191.
312. In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., Judge Posner opined that it
is unlikely that a copyright “would confer an economically significant monopoly, one that
would raise the price of the monopolized good well above, and depress its output well
below, the competitive level.” 816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987).
313. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
314. See generally supra Part II.A.
315. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir.
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
316. Id.; see supra Part II.B.3.
317. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1170; see supra Part II.B.3.
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to gain control over areas outside the scope of the monopoly”318 would
enable the defendant to present a different set of facts, and essentially
answer a different legal question not limited to an antitrust analysis, which
is predominately based on the determination of anticompetitive restraints on
competition.
It can even be argued that antitrust and copyright laws are in direct
contention with each other. Antitrust law aims to protect competition and
copyright law aims to protect the competitors. Antitrust law seeks to limit
monopolistic behavior whereas copyright law grants a limited right to
monopoly.319 At minimum, misuse is broader than antitrust principles, and
particular conduct can constitute misuse without amounting to an antitrust
violation.320
Based on the foregoing, this Note argues in favor of a modified public
policy approach. Nonetheless, due to the subjective and uncertain aspects
of the public policy analysis, public policy interests should first be
grounded in the constitutional grant of authority. Accordingly, the
Lasercomb and Alcatel framing of the public policy analysis, in terms of
whether the arrangement inhibits progress or creativity, should be adopted.
Secondly, the public policy approach should not be viewed in a vacuum,
and it should be treated as only part of a much more probing analysis.
Accordingly, this Part proposes an approach under which the public policy
question is only the first step in a three-step evaluation process.
Additionally, in order to avoid an approach that would either work in
opposition to, or impede application of, the Sherman Act,321 the suggested
approach encompasses aspects of the antitrust rule of reason analysis, but is
tailored to the specific goals of copyright law instead of focusing only on
restraints to competition.
C. Copyright Misuse Should Be Analyzed
Under a Three-Tiered Approach
The current lack of uniformity deprives copyright owners of adequate
notice as to what behaviors could potentially amount to misuse and lead to
the detrimental result of being barred from recovery. At the same time, a
potential copyright infringer cannot predict, with an adequate degree of
certainty, the likelihood of success in asserting copyright misuse as an
affirmative defense, and is thus deprived of the opportunity to take into
account all benefits and risks before deciding to infringe the copyright.

318. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
319. See generally supra Part I.
320. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942); see also supra
note 306 and accompanying text.
321. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987).
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The resolution proposed in this Note aims to provide much-needed
uniformity without irritating or overlooking important goals of both
copyright and antitrust law. This Note proposes a three-tiered framework,
as follows. First, the court must determine whether the tying arrangement
is outside the scope and boundaries of the copyright grant. If it is, the
copyright misuse defense prevails. If it is not, the court must next inquire
about the availability of feasible economic alternatives for the defendant. If
there are, the defense fails. If such alternatives do not exist, the court must
last examine whether the copyright owner has any critical business
justifications for the tying arrangement. If so, the defense fails; if not, the
defense prevails. The alleged infringer carries the burden of proof for the
first two inquiries and the copyright owner carries the burden for the final
inquiry. The following subsections describe the framework of the proposed
approach in greater detail.
1. The Public Policy of Promoting Progress
The first step is a determination of whether the challenged behavior is
within the scope and boundaries of the copyright grant. If the behavior is
found to be outside the copyright grant, then the copyright misuse analysis
comes to an end and the defense prevails. If, however, the tying
arrangement does not interfere with public policy goals, it should not be
deemed per se unlawful, even if it is too attenuated or seemingly
unreasonable, and the court should proceed to the second tier of the
analysis.
Since the behavior in question, or the specific tying arrangement giving
rise to the defense, will almost certainly not be explicitly stated in the
copyright certificate (assuming that the copyright is even registered),322 the
question of whether the arrangement falls within the copyright grant is
directly related to whether it violates the public policies supporting
copyright law. Accordingly, a mere showing of two separate products
should not suffice and should not render the arrangement unlawful without
further inquiry. In contrast with the antitrust approach,323 the question here
should be narrowly defined—whether the products are tied in such a
manner that frustrates the public policy underlying copyright grants.
Following Lasercomb and Alcatel, arrangements that inhibit progress or
discourage creativity should be found to violate the public policy
underlying copyright laws.324 Thus, this uniform conception of the public
policy supporting copyright law, which is most in line with the language
and objectives of the constitutional grant of copyright power,325 should be

322. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
323. See generally supra Part I.B.3.
324. See generally Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999);
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
325. See supra Part I.A.
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applied to avoid inconsistent results as seen in prior cases purporting to
apply the public policy approach.326
Furthermore, a defendant asserting the copyright misuse defense should
not be required to prove market power over “the tying product to enable it
to restrain trade in the market for the tied product,” or that “a ‘not
insubstantial’ amount of commerce in the market for the tied product is
foreclosed.”327 These two elements are relevant to antitrust law because the
evil it attempts to prevent directly relates to competition restraints and
monopoly power.328 With copyright law, the focus is on finding a balance
between rewarding the copyright holder and ensuring that the granted
limited monopoly does not stifle progress;329 existence of trade restraints or
monopoly power is not indicative of an encroachment on that goal.
To illustrate, in the Apple iPhone and mapping application
hypothetical,330 if a defendant in a copyright infringement claim
successfully proves, by relying on market studies, expert testimonies, or
other pertinent evidence, that the arrangement hinders progress in the
mapping application market and is thus violative of public policy, then the
misuse defense bars the plaintiff’s recovery. If public policy goals are not
frustrated, however, then the court proceeds to the second tier, inquiring
into the economic feasibility of available alternatives. In that manner, the
public policy approach continues to be available for conduct that
undermines copyright policies without discounting antitrust principles that
tying arrangements often trigger.331
2. The Economic Feasibility of Available Alternatives
Tying arrangements, by definition, affect market competition in the tied
product, and thus antitrust principles and laws are inevitably triggered. An
analysis that stops at the public policy inquiry falls short, and is oblivious to
the interplay between copyright law and antitrust law in balancing
competition and monopoly forces in any given market. The following two
tiers of the analysis account for that interplay while remaining conscious
that antitrust violations can be asserted independent of the copyright misuse
doctrine. Thus, the available alternatives and business justifications prongs,
while important factors under the antitrust rule of reason analysis, are
reframed here to address copyrights more specifically.
The second tier of the proposed approach accounts for conduct that may
not violate public policy per se, but ultimately has that effect. In both
Lasercomb and Alcatel, the agreements prohibited licensees from creating

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See supra Part II.A.
KALINOWSKI, supra note 184, § 22.02; see supra Part I.B.3.
See generally supra Part I.B.
See generally supra Part I.A.
See supra intro.
See supra Part II.A.
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new software—an example of conduct that directly hinders progress.332
However, at times the arrangement in question does not directly impact
progress but, instead, ultimately has that effect.333 When the cost of an
alternative is substantial enough that a competitor in the tied product will
likely not pursue it, then it is an unreasonable alternative. To some extent,
this resembles the hybrid approach applied in Apple Inc., because it
essentially provides an alternative on which the defense can prevail in the
absence of a public policy violation. This step of the analysis is
distinguishable from Apple Inc.’s approach, however, because the focus is
not on the effects of the restraint on competition, but rather, more
specifically on whether such restraint will inevitably hinder progress by
making it infeasible to participate in the market of the tied product.
In Apple Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s distinction of Alcatel is not very
convincing. Just as the Fifth Circuit in Alcatel held that it is not technically
feasible for DGI to use a non-DSC operating system, it is presumably not
technically feasible for Psystar to simply just develop its own competing
hardware and software.334 Thus, applying this approach would have given
Psystar the opportunity to prove that it could not simply develop its own
software. More precisely, a court applying the proposed approach would
have reasonably reached the second tier of the analysis since the tying
arrangement did not hinder progress, but rather prompted competitors to
create their own products. Subsequently, the court would have considered
all other alternatives to being excluded from the market as a result of the
tying arrangement, and Psystar would have had to prove the alternatives’
impracticability.
This tier of the analysis, by determining all other available alternatives to
the consequences arising out of the tying arrangement and evaluating their
economic feasibility, aims to eliminate disparities in outcomes under the
public policy approach. In return, this ensures that the outcome of the
defense does not turn on whether public policy was directly or indirectly
violated.
It is also notable that the analysis here is not as searching as the antitrust
rule of reason335 because factors that do not directly relate to the feasibility
of alternatives should not be considered dispositive. In this context, the
court is simply looking to see if the alternatives’ infeasibility provides for a
compelling enough reason, in the absence of a public policy rationale, to
proscribe the tying arrangement in question.
For example, in an infringement claim brought against Google in the
context of the Apple iPhone and mapping application hypothetical,336 this
tier would play a crucial role in the analysis. If Apple were able to prove
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See supra Part II.A.1, 3.
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.4.
See supra Part II.A.3–4.
See supra Part I.B.3.b.
See supra intro.
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that the arrangement did not violate public policy because it did not hinder
progress but rather encouraged its competitors to develop their own phones
and mapping applications, Google would be given the opportunity to put
forth the infeasibility of the alternatives. If Google prevailed with respect
to this assertion, Apple would be found to have engaged in copyright
misuse. In that manner, the modified public policy approach takes into
account conduct that indirectly hinders progress by making it infeasible for
competitors to participate in the market of the tied product.
3. The Critical Business Justifications
If the tying arrangement is found to violate public policy or to negate any
economically feasible alternatives, the misuse defense should prevail unless
the copyright owner is able to establish critical business justifications. This
aspect of the analysis is similar to the antitrust legitimate business
justification337 but is even more demanding because the court here would
not be weighing a number of factors. Rather, a court would inquire as to
whether there is a business justification so critical that it trumps the
underlying copyright goals. To remain aligned with the constitutional
copyright grant, the copyright owner’s business justification should directly
relate to its ability to exercise the granted limited monopoly power without
any unreasonable burdens or interferences. Furthermore, this aspect of the
analysis should be subject to the courts’ most searching review as a way of
ensuring that it is not a free pass to copyright owners but only an available
option, permitted with caution.
With respect to the Apple mapping application hypothetical,338 it is
difficult to conceive of any such critical need for Apple to tie its own
mapping application to its iPhone. Accordingly, pursuant to the proposed
approach, if the arrangement is found to either violate public policy or the
competitors’ alternatives are not feasible, Apple would be found to have
misused its mapping application copyright.
CONCLUSION
The three-tiered approach proposed in this Note balances the burden of
proof between the copyright owner and copyright infringer. It provides
judicial expediency for the more straightforward cases by allowing any
arrangement that frustrates the public policy goals embodied in the
constitutional grant of copyright power to be deemed per se illegal. At the
same time, in more complex cases, as the majority of cases are likely to be,
it provides a multifaceted method of analysis under which the lack of
economically feasible alternatives can establish misuse in favor of the
defense, and the existence of critical business justifications can justify a
tying arrangement that would otherwise constitute misuse.
337. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
338. See supra intro.
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The proposed approach aims to further the policy rationales underlying
copyright law, without intruding upon or unnecessarily replicating the
policy rationales of antitrust law. More importantly, the proposed approach
provides a defined framework, pursuant to which uniformity amongst
courts can be achieved. At a minimum, it is an initial step toward achieving
uniformity and clarifying the currently ambiguous and complex copyright
misuse defense.

